Conscious Commitment: Monsanto, LLC

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Monsanto Technology, LLC, is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Missouri. Monsanto is engaged in the development, licensing, and conditional sale of genetically modified agricultural seeds in interstate commerce. The natural biological and chemical makeup of these seeds has been tampered with in several ways, primarily to increase resistance to insect pests and Monsanto-made herbicides, and they have been patented under 35 U.S.C. §161. Monsanto routinely compels growers of the seeds to sign a uniform Technology/Stewardship Agreement. In the MT/SA, the farmer agrees (among other things) to limit his use of the seeds to a single planting, to use only Monsanto herbicides on his crops, to allow Monsanto unbridled access to his property and Internet records, to use only Monsanto-approved cotton gins, and not to conduct or allow any independent studies of the safety or properties of the genetically modified technology. The MT/SA does not mention the applicable patent statutes, and there is no indication that signers are made aware in any way of the content of those laws. Monsanto holds hundreds of these contracts, mostly in interstate commerce.

There is no dispute that Monsanto is the owner of the patents controlling the seed technologies it has developed. However, the MT/SA is an unconscionable contract under §2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code and should be nullified as such.

Relevant Patents Limited in Scope

35 U.S.C. §163 simply and conclusively delineates the significance of a United States plant patent such as those held by Monsanto: "In the case of a plant patent, the grant shall include the right to exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering for sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any of its parts, throughout the United States, or from importing the plant so reproduced, or any parts thereof, into the United States." (Emphasis supplied). This simple statute shows that Congress clearly did not envision the near-absolute control over agricultural development now held by Monsanto. As opposed to granting patent holders free rein, §163 actually strikes a delicate balance between agribusiness' incentives for new development and citizens' interest in ensuring that essential staple foods would not fall under the exclusive control of a handful of companies or inventors.

Under the plain text of §163, farmers must purchase new varieties of patented genetically modified seed from the holder of the patent. However, the use of the qualifier "asexually" conclusively indicates that the legislature intended the natural breeding, saving, and planting of seeds to remain legal. Any other reading of these terms would render the word "asexually" mere surplusage, and therefore should be rejected. As the Supreme Court stated in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, "Courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous." 503 U.S. 249 (1992).

In the context of the §163, "asexually" is a highly specific word, and its removal would have no effect on the clarity or grammatical structure of the sentence. If its inclusion had been supererogatory, Congress would doubtlessly have removed it during its 1998 revision of the section (found at Pub. L. 105-289). Instead, it merely changed a single clause - substituted the word "include" to "shall be of" - but left "asexually" in place. This change could reasonably be interpreted to proscribe other behavior, such as the artificial replication of a patent holder's genetic codes by rival companies, but it does not in any way interfere with an individual's ability to plant seeds grown in his soil and tended by his hard work. As was said in Trailmobile Co v. Whirls, 331 US 40 (1947), "The interpretation of statutes cannot safely be made to rest upon mute intermediate legislative maneuvers."

Not only is Monsanto's crafty construction of this clear, concise statute a transparently deliberate misunderstanding designed to enlarge its profits while unlawfully curtailing traditional farming practices, it is blatantly inconsistent with accepted interpretation of American law. Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit, wrote in Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage that laws "should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." 218 F.5d 7 (1914). In Schulte Co. v. Gangi, the Supreme Court again recognized the importance of these context clues: "For the purposes of judicial enforcement, the 'policy' of a statute should be drawn out of its terms, as nourished by their proper environment, and not, like nitrogen, out of the air." 328 U.S. 108 (1946). In Wright v. Denn, Justice Story held that "the law does not decide upon conjectures, but upon plain, reasonable, and certain expressions of intention." 10 Wheat. 204 (1825). In United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, Justice Frankfurter noted that courts should not "extrapolate meaning from surmises and speculation and free-wheeling utterances, especially... in disregard of the terms in which Congress has chosen to express its purpose." 345 U.S. 295 (1953). In CT National Bank v. Germain, supra, it was held that "in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Finally, in United States v. Pulaski Co., it was held that "there is a strong presumption that the literal meaning is the true one, especially as against a construction that is not interpretation, but perversion." 243 U.S. 97 (1917). That statement seems equally applicable here.

Inapplicability of the Plant Variety Protection Act

7 U.S.C §2402, part of the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 ("PVPA"), dictates that "The breeder of any sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the variety, or the successor in interest of the breeder, shall be entitled to plant variety protection for the variety." However, this provision is entirely irrelevant to the case at hand for two reasons.

Firstly, the Act only applies to "sexually reproduced" plants. This clearly does not cover the complex and unnatural process of genetic manipulation or mutation. From the disparate treatment of sexually reproduced cultivars - entitled to variety protection certificates - and asexually created breeds - protected by plant patents - it is evident that the legislature intended this logical division. Any other reading would render either the word "sexually" in the PVPA or the word "asexually" in 35 U.S.C. §163 redundant.

Secondly, even if the PVPA does protect Monsanto's creations to a limited extent, the provision of the MT/SA proscribing farmers from saving and replanting seed still vastly exceeds the PVPA's protections. The vast majority of the soybeans, corn and cotton grown on American farms is not produced for horticultural purposes, and therefore §2543 states:

"It shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this section. A bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes or from seed produced by descent on such farm from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes shall not constitute an infringement."

This unmistakeably protects the right of Monsanto's customers to continue the traditional propagation of ancient and basic cultivated crops.

MT/SA Not a Valid or Enforceable Contract

In §4(f)-(i) of the MT/SA, all growers of Monsanto seeds agree:

"f. To use Seed containing Monsanto Technologies solely for a single planting of a commercial crop, except in the case of Genuity® Roundup Ready® Alfalfa where a single planting may be used for multiple cuttings. g. Not to save or clean any crop produced from Seed for planting, not to supply Seed produced from Seed to anyone for planting, not to plant Seed for production other than for Monsanto or a Monsanto licensed seed company under a seed production contract.  h. Not to transfer any Seed containing patented Monsanto Technologies to any other person or entity for planting. i. To plant and/or clean Seed for Seed production, if and only if, Grower has entered into a valid, written Seed production agreement with a Seed company that is licensed by Monsanto to produce Seed. Grower must either physically deliver to that licensed Seed Company or must sell for non-seed purposes or use for non-seed purposes all of the Seed produced pursuant to a Seed production agreement." MT/SA at 1.

These terms are grounded in the assertion found in section 5(b) of the MT/SA, infra, that "Monsanto Technologies are protected under U.S. patent law." However, Monsanto's extraordinarily loose construction of these patent laws is plainly repugnant to their actual meaning. This deceptive statement appears highly likely to mislead growers as to the rights they actually retain under the vaguely invoked laws, and defraud them into waiving liberties they are unaware they have.

The bare fact that the growers signed the MT/SA fails to validate its usurious terms. Any threadbare defense that Monsanto enjoyed an unrestrained freedom to contract with its growers has been contradicted by the Supreme Court in its decisions dating back to 1908 (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412). In Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., it opined that "Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them." 294 U.S. 290 (1935). In Nebbia v. New York (291 U.S. 502 (1934)), it wrote that "government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows." In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, it held: "There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses... Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." 219 U.S. 549 (1911). In 1943, it described American law as "a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of noninterference has withered, at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls." West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.

Not only is freedom of contract a relative concept, its invocation requires a valid contract at the very least - and the MT/SA fails to meet that standard. The requirement that assent to a binding agreement be an informed and rational choice is one of the oldest and basic tenets of contract law. A waiver of any protections or privileges by contract or otherwise, particularly those economic and social liberties secured by the Due Process Clause, must be made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). A promise or bargain made in the absence of this mutual educated voluntariness - frequently referred to as consensus ad idem or "meeting of the minds" - is no contract at all.

This simple rule is not in any way negated by the rise of mass commercial contracts, such as the MT/SA, that corporations enter into with hundreds or even thousands of their consumers. If this new social reality has any affect on established common law at all, it only renders the requirement more essential, lest large entities like Monsanto abuse their inherent advantage in the bargaining process. As was asked in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors: "Where can the buyer go to negotiate for better protection? Such control and limitation of his remedies are inimical to the public welfare and, at the very least, call for great care by the courts to avoid injustice through application of common-law principles of freedom of contract." 32 N.J. 358 (1960). See also Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2nd Cir. 1955) ("Standardized contracts have been described as those in which one predominant party will dictate its law to an undetermined multiple rather than to an individual. They are said to resemble a law rather than a meeting of the minds").

These contracts are also deemed unenforceable by Missouri law, which says that "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract." Uniform Commercial Code, §2-302. Yet Monsanto continues to peddle the MT/SA despite this unambiguous prohibition of such behavior.

The MT/SA clearly does not meet these requirements. In a society where criminal suspects must be diligently educated as to their rights to remain silent and to the advice of counsel - information most Americans already know - any expectation that farmers should be intimately acquainted with the terms of obscure legislation seems inconsistent and unreasonable. As Justice Jackson noted from the bench in Federal Crop Ins. Corp v. Merrill, "No farmer worth his salt would waste any time reading a dreary publication like the Federal Register." 332 U.S. 380 (1947). It is doubtful that the patent laws would be more practical reading material.

In sum, the MT/SA, though masquerading as an attempt to ensure the security of Monsanto's scientific innovations, is actually an exorbitant contract that significantly exceeds the protection afforded to GMO inventors under federal law, and therefore should be nullified under the Uniform Commercial Code. As then-Judge Cardozo said in 1928, courts should decide cases "not [on the basis of] what has been done under the statute, but what may reasonably be done under it." In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401. Grave injustice would inevitably result from allowing Monsanto to continue mongering their unconscionable "agreements," and therefore the courts must act promptly to prevent the perpetuation of their patently false claims.

My Conscious Commitment to a Free Market

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thosedays.jpgCapitalism.

The word conjures up mental images of vast fields of low-lying factories turning out various commodities at unprecedented speeds. A board of directors, assembled on the fourteenth floor of some glass-and-steel temple of merchandising, discussing annual returns. A network of spidery railroads and ship routes and interstate highways, spun first around the continent and then the globe. A 3D model of the "next big thing," revolving slowly in circles on brightly lit screens. Firm handshakes, locked vaults, and indecipherable numbers and abbreviations whizzing by in a procession of green and red lights. An entire culture built around the acquisition of assets and influence alike, a fast-paced game with few rules and a universally coveted prize of market dominance.

However, this conception - of industries dominated by billion-dollar enterprises - cannot rightly be called by the term "capitalism." That word, in its pure and original context, denotes a free market, an economic environment requiring only ingenuity, efficiency, and hard work for success. That was conceived in a time of greater opportunity and untapped resources, when competition and the human drive to improve products, methods and ideas were essential to continued national expansion. That was reality before the age of consolidation, prior to the protracted decline of interpersonal commerce.

The national struggle to preserve capitalism as it was initially envisioned began in earnest in 1890, with the passage of the landmark Sherman Anti-Trust Act. This officially criminalized "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" (15 U.S.C. §1), and was the first significant recognition of the right to a free economy. Corporate actions such as price-fixing, collaborating to eliminate competitors, and merging to dominate an entire field were thereafter prosecuted as infringements of this right. In the years following the law's enactment, it was used against railroad titans, banking institutions, manufacturers of overpriced necessities, and those seeking to further augment their inherently unequal bargaining power in the making of employment contracts. In 1914, it was buttressed by the Clayton Act, which protected labor unions from the threat of antitrust suits while strengthening the provisions targeted at corporate offenders and their powerful executives. Since then, the government's vigilance in ensuing compliance has fluctuated based on a number of factors, primarily the political climate and the courts' ideological tendencies.

Even though antitrust has dropped out of the national spotlight in the past decades, fair but uncompromising enforcement remains vital to the collective prosperity of both citizens and businesses, spreading wealth across an industry and its workers that would otherwise be concentrated in the coffers of a solitary company.

I. Monopoly Eliminates Jobs

In twenty-first century America, unemployment and low wages are major obstacles in the effort to restore the economy. Deleterious deals such as NAFTA and the proposed TPP shrink the domestic market by exporting jobs, but they are only part of the problem. Consolidation is another major factor in the stagnation of salaries and the dearth of available employment. 

Monopolization is a relatively simple phenomenon: two separate companies, each engaged in the manufacture of the same materials, separately employ approximately five hundred workers each. Then a merger is agreed on, and the number of workers necessary to operate one process, even if it turns out more products than one of the original two lines at a faster rate, will still be significantly lower than the combined total of the existing two companies' workforce. This reduction in the number of open jobs affects a living wage in two ways. Firstly, it lowers the wage outright by increasing the number of willing candidates for extant positions and denying dissatisfied applicants the opportunity to work for a nonexistent competitor. Secondly, it gives the new conglomerate increased power over the prices of its products, decreasing the purchasing power of the already substandard rate.

Though the political promises of the 2016 campaign have largely revolved around statutory increases in the minimum wage and the expansion of welfare benefits, these measures only serve to shift the costs of unlawful corporate practices onto the government. The monopolies have grown secure in their own dominance and lost all incentive to develop or maintain quality products, fair prices and wages, and accountability for any defects in their services, and these surface symptoms of a fundamentally blighted economic system cannot be remedied by relieving corporations of their core social functions and responsibilities.

II. Competition as a Civil Right

The relation between a free society and a free economy has been trivialized in recent years by the classification of antitrust enforcement as a regulatory matter. Violations of the Sherman Act are treated as mala prohibita - acts which are made illegal by statute, but which are not inherently immoral - and corporate convicts can officially expiate their wrongdoing with insignificant fines, suspended or nonexistent sentences, lenient civil settlements, and a complete lack of censure from their peers. The quiet and comparatively painless resolution of cases in an administrative and private, rather than adversary and public, venue fails to discourage recidivism and prevent similar transgressions by other companies. Therefore, though the streamlining of the process has facilitated secretive and speedy settlement, it has led to grave mistakes in the way monopolization is perceived and prosecuted.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments explicitly safeguards "life, liberty, and property," unequivocally prohibiting unreasonable encroachment on the right to acquire and maintain private assets. This is a double-edged statement, however, and its meaning has varied with the vicissitudes of over two hundred years of social changes. In the past it has been interpreted to preclude any regulation interfering with absolute "liberty of contract," even such essential measures as the minimum wage, the eight-hour day, and the Sherman Act (see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (298 U.S. 587 (1936)). After the ensuing corporate lawlessness and rampant monopoly led to the Great Depression, this dogma was re-examined, and it was conclusively established that "the Constitution does not make conspiracy a civil right." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1952). In its modern meaning, the Due Process Clause simply preserves the right to economic as well as political pluralism.

The liberty to conduct business without interference or intimidation from larger and more powerful private entities remains a vital constitutional right, however. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights, 543 F.Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex 1982). Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, conclusively provides:  "Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."  The elimination of racial discrimination, the Act's main purpose, has largely been achieved - but its broader objective, the protection of equality on all fronts, requires a freedom of enterprise incompatible with the industrial oligarchy that defines our current economic landscape. The fight for our fundamental civil rights has resulted in monumental progress on multiple fronts, but it is far from over; our country cannot be truly free as long as this neglected element of due process is violated openly and daily.

Conclusion

To meet the burden of proof in antitrust cases, plaintiffs must "present direct or circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove that the [defendants] and others had a conscious commitment to a common scheme, designed to achieve an unlawful objective." Monsanto Corp. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752 (1984). To honor the provisions of the Sherman Act by showing an equal level of "conscious commitment" towards a lawful and progressive objective, I am hereby launching a series to expose monopoly, explore the statutes that govern it, and examine the enforcement process in this country.

Calling All Commentary on TWC and Charter Merger

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Just yesterday, the Justice Department and Federal Communications Commission moved to allow the merger of Time Warner Cable and Charter, a $78 billion dollar deal that would have far-ranging effects on American telecommunications. The company created by this combination would be known as "New Charter," and would have unprecedented control over the nation's media.

The lawsuit, settled the same day it was filed, alleged that the merger would hurt online video distributors, or OVDs, that rely on their ability to obtain licensing for television materials. The proposed settlement precludes New Charter from "entering into or enforcing any agreement with a programmer that forbids, limits or creates incentives to limit the programmer's provision of content to one or more OVDs," and also disallows usage-based data caps. This serves to protect streaming apps and services dependent on access to video or music content.

However, even though the settlement protects OVDs, it does little to protect the general population from the anticompetitive environment this combination would create. For example, it does not address the effects New Charter's market dominance might have on over-the-air broadcast television or consumer Internet use. This omission could lead to the decreased availability of free, quality programming - but we can work to correct that oversight.

A 60-day public comment period will soon commence as the settlement is published in the Federal Register, and we at PlanetGreen encourage our readers to voice their concerns about the merger. Our opinions do matter, and can effectively preserve the airwaves as a public and free resource. All submitted comments will be posted online and made available to the U.S. District Court considering the settlement, giving regulators and the Court the added perspective of a public that will be deeply affected by their decisions.
Just yesterday, the Supreme Court denied review in Brooker v. Alabama, the Eighth Amendment case of a seventy-six year old man condemned under Alabama's "three strikes" law to life in prison on nonviolent charges. Despite compelling briefs from the petitioners and the obvious inequity of the sentencing practices, the Court chose continued inaction over a much-needed second look at our outdated, largely ineffective justice system.

This is not the first time that our nation's highest tribunal has declined to address the problem and consider all the relevant constitutional issues. However, it is still highly surprising that it would avoid the issue amid both the ongoing national debate over mandatory minimums and the changing political reality of criminal justice reform.

$150 = 50 Years


In November of 1995, an Army veteran named Leandro Andrade walked into a California Kmart store and left with five children's videotapes, which he had not paid for. Fourteen days later, he repeated the performance at another Kmart location, and was charged with shoplifting nine tapes worth, in all, roughly one hundred and fifty-three dollars. The theft of Batman and Casper is not usually worthy of much mention in the important debate over the criminal justice system, and it should never have been a major issue. After all, petty theft is a misdemeanor that usually carries only six months in jail - not two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life, which is what Andrade got.

But he had two prior convictions on his record, and therefore was a casualty of the "three strikes" laws. These statutes impose mandatory minimum penalties on those already convicted of two felonies, no matter how trivial the third infraction is. Their proponents argue that they effectively deter habitual offenders and increase accountability for crime; but, in reality, they often result in blatantly disproportionate sentences that hinder the goal of eventually reintegrating transgressors into society.

In a later challenge, the Ninth Circuit granted relief to Andrade on the grounds that his sentence was "cruel and unusual punishment," and the Supreme Court subsequently agreed to hear the case. It appeared to be a clear-cut example of inordinate, unrealistic penal practices, and the lower court's decision was almost universally expected to stand. However, the Court chose to reverse, reasoning per Justice O'Connor that because a possibility of parole still existed (in 2046, when Andrade would be eighty-seven years old), the sentence was not "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" (28 U.S.C. §2254). By invoking an ordinary statute to avoid addressing a constitutional question, the Court narrowed its own ability to grant relief further, resulting in the untrammeled long-term incarceration of relatively petty offenders across the country.

However, even though the Court may have rejected the Eighth Amendment argument against mandatory sentencing, the Constitution and common-law decisions interpreting it still indicate the illegality of the practice.

Separation of Powers

Despite the ruling in Lockyer v. Andrade, the courts have always recognized that the ability of a judge to tailor the law to the facts of a case is essential to substantive justice. As Justice Holmes famously observed: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics" (The Common Law, 1881). Justice Frankfurter seconded this from the bench when he called due process "the least frozen concept of our law -- the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society" (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 20-21 (1956)). Now, though, the legislature encroaches on that judicial function through its ill-considered mandatory minimum laws. Not only does this interfere with the historical procedure of the courts, but it violates the constitutional system of checks and balances.

The 1965 case of United States v. Cox concerned a U.S. Attorney threatened with contempt of court after he refused to sign an indictment, even though he was acting under the direction of then-Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. In a landmark decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the prosecutor was a member of the executive branch, and therefore that the contempt order unlawfully infringed upon the separation of powers (342 F.2d 167). The mandatory minimum laws have a similar effect, forcing judges to impose heavy penalties regardless of the dictates of individualized justice.

As Blackstone once noted in his Commentaries, "In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty." 1 B.C. 146. In today's system of compulsory inclemency, it appears that this basic tenet has been forgotten.

"Making One Year Count" for Don Blankenship

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Blankenship.jpgJust yesterday, the "Making One Year Count" movement made its social media debut. This letter-writing campaign addresses the blatant miscarriage of justice in the Don Blankenship mine explosion trial. The initiative's goal is to deliver three hundred and sixty-five letters to Blankenship during his year in prison, showing him that though the courts may have been lenient, citizens have neither forgotten the lives lost in the tragedy nor the injuries caused daily by the coal industry.

Today, I made my contribution to this endeavor:


Dear Mr. Blankenship,

Whatever words I can write on this page feel pitifully insufficient, to say the least, but in honor of those your negligence killed, those still alive but suffering daily from the hurting you caused, and those living in a country pained by pollution and the injurious practices of your industry as a whole, I have to try.  It's the most I can do to send you a letter like this one, and hope that you get three hundred and sixty-four more reminders of what justice truly is and should have been in your case. I am going to start by reminding you of something else: that if things had been different, and you had been one of the unlucky ones, compelled by the basic necessity to provide for oneself to descend into your Tartarean "workplaces," you probably would have received four hundred and thirty-five times what you did get (fifteen years, the penalty for manslaughter, multiplied by twenty-nine counts).

But even that isn't a victory, except in the hollowest sense. And maybe that's enough for you, but somehow I doubt it. Because even after you do return to the outside world, you will sometimes unavoidably think back on everything that happened. The last time somebody tried to caution you, and you brushed them off and went back to business as usual. The explosion you could have prevented at marginal cost to your company. The twenty-nine people whose dreams of a better life were powerful enough to send them into your mines, whose dreams will now never be realized. The families and friends of the killed, everyone who had grown accustomed to having them around. Somehow, I just don't believe you'll always be able to smirk at all that.

When I was reading about your trial, it called to mind another case that took place in Idaho over a hundred years ago. You may know about it. It was the trial of William "Big Bill" Haywood, a labor leader of the Western Federation of Miners. He was unfairly framed by the mining interests with the murder of Frank Steunenberg, and represented against those charges by Clarence Darrow. Anyway, the passage of Darrow's summation that reminded me of you goes like this:

"But, gentlemen, he and his mother, his wife and his children are not my chief concern in this case. If you should decree that he must die, ten thousand men will work down in the mines to send a portion of the proceeds of their labor to take care of that widow and those orphan children, and a million people throughout the length and the breadth of the civilized world will send their messages of kindness and good cheer to comfort them in their bereavement. It is not for them I plead.

Other men have died, other men have died in the same cause in which Bill Haywood has risked his life, men strong with devotion, men who love liberty, men who love their fellow men have raised their voices in defense of the poor, in defense of justice, have made their good fight and have met death on the scaffold, on the rack, in the flame and they will meet it again until the world grows old and gray. Bill Haywood is no better than the rest. He can die if die he needs, he can die if this jury decrees it; but, oh, gentlemen, don't think for a moment that if you hang him you will crucify the labor movement of the world.

Don't think that you will kill the hopes and the aspirations and the desires of the weak and the poor, you men, unless you people who are anxious for this blood--are you so blind as to believe that liberty will die when he is dead? Do you think there are no brave hearts and no other strong arms, no other devoted souls who will risk their life in that great cause which has demanded martyrs in every age of this world? There are others, and these others will come to take his place, will come to carry the banner where he could not carry it."

This year will soon be through, and this tragic story will be consigned to the casebooks alongside Haywood's. But long after both of us are forgotten, that century-old devotion will still be there, because you can't kill solidarity. You should know that better than I do, actually. I've never tried.

Before you can finally put me down and go back to what you were doing, I want to say one thing more. I believe in justice, but I am not the vengeful sort. I never have wanted to see a man killed, whether by a misguided criminal or by the state. That's the chief irony: for all the technical defenses you concocted and resources you invested in the attempt to thwart a single prosecution, you cannot say that for yourself. Those miners' only crime was in being poor, having to make a living for themselves from the earth with their own hands, and yet in your Upper Big Branch that was a capital offense.

Think about that.

Sincerely,
Katrianna Brisack

Our earlier coverage of the case, both a historical perspective on the issues and an announcement of the verdict, can be found here.

Update: SC Split over Labor, 4-4

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Just this Tuesday, the Supreme Court handed down a one-page per curiam decision in the controversial case Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass'n, (14-915), which concerned whether or not teachers could be compelled to subsidize a union they had not joined. The Court effectively ruled that they could, simply by failing to muster a fifth vote for reversal.

This ruling sets no lasting precedent, but it is unlikely that the Court will overturn both Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and this opinion in the future. President Obama's current nominee to fill the vacant seat, Judge Merrick Garland, has frequently sided with organized labor in the lower courts, and will probably join the liberal bloc in a possible rehearing, denying Friedrichs' claim more permanently. Even if this specific case, or another presenting a similar question, is reheard before the Court changes, it is unlikely to have a different result.

Though this may appear to be a triumph of the right to collective bargaining, in reality it weakens the protection of individual opinions that is essential to the preservation of our constitutional framework. As the Court observed more than seventy years ago, "It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings... We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies to those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent" West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). That statement seems equally applicable now.

Our earlier "On Certiorari" discussion of this case with Michael Carvin, petitioner's lawyer

Enjoin Yourself! (From Using Apple Gadgets)

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"Apple core!"

"Baltimore!"

"Who's your friend?"

"Some criminal insurgent guerrillas. Why do you ask?"


Just today, Apple unveiled the newest version of their popular smartphone, called the iPhone SE. Not much is different about the SE model - it is merely a smaller version of the current iPhone. It uses the same microprocessor, essentially the same camera, and roughly the same features.

It also has the same embattled encryption technology, and chances are very good the date of its release - one day before the first major hearing in the Syed Farook case - is an intentional attempt to sidestep our government and continue marketing devices which pose a significant risk to public safety.

Searches of personal effects conducted without a warrant, including searches of smartphones, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to our Constitution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, and Katz v. United States389 U.S. 347. However, the Supreme Court has never ruled that evidence procured with such a warrant is invalid under the exclusionary rule, and resisting such an order when lawfully procured is traditionally referred to not as a stand for liberty, but an instance of obstruction of justice.

Apple is deliberately misconstruing our founding charter in its protracted battle with the DOJ and the FBI, attempting to siphon profit and publicity from a national tragedy. Though this behavior from a billion-dollar corporation is nothing new, the ambivalence towards and even admiration of this conduct shown by those who continue to purchase the company's overpriced products is surprising.

Therefore, we at PlanetGreen ask you to join us in refraining from the use of all technologies created or marketed by Apple. Though the company definitely won't have a patriotic epiphany its profits keep skyrocketing, if we band together we can prove that Democratic candidate Al Smith was right when he declared in 1928: "The best way to kill anything un-American is to drag it out into the open, because anything un-American cannot live in the sunlight."

UPDATE - Even though our government has been successful in unlocking Farook's phone without enlisting Apple's help, the boycott is still on, at least until the company recognizes that our national security is more important than protecting a criminal's so-called "right" that has never been recognized as such.
herblockcp.jpgJust yesterday, President Obama nominated appeals judge Merrick Garland, currently of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, to replace the late Antonin Scalia on the Supreme Court. This nomination, made while the Court was on break, immediately rekindled debate over whether a lame-duck President should be allowed to appoint candidates of his choice to the Court. Ironically, though, while Judge Garland has been publicly cast as an unpredictable centrist, it is the GOP's politicians who have done the majority of the swing-voting in this situation: first supporting him and praising his qualifications for years, then vowing to keep him off this country's highest bench at all costs.

However, in refusing to even consider Judge Garland, these conservatives have failed to realize that they could be worsening their own party's position. With each new contest, it seems increasingly unavoidable that Hillary Clinton will be the Democratic nominee. For the Republicans, Donald Trump is likely unstoppable, having already aggregated 673 out of 1,237 necessary delegates (that's a 119-delegate lead over both his opponents combined). In all probability, however, the billionaire insurgent will perform poorly in the general election, forcing the hard-liners to confirm a potential Justice named by a Democrat. And if they succeed in compelling Obama to withdraw Garland's name, they could face an even more liberal appointee.

Another misconception about this development is that Democrats should be unhappy with the choice simply because he was not the farthest-left candidate on the short list. To be sure, his experience as a federal prosecutor in many high-profile domestic terrorism cases may have helped to shape his views on criminal procedure, which would probably be solidly to the right of the Court's current liberal wing. However, his record on the D.C. Circuit still evinces a more progressive viewpoint on those issues than that of Sri Srinivasan, who has never overturned a single criminal conviction.

In labor law cases, Judge Garland has consistently upheld the NLRB's decisions and safeguarded the liberties of workers and the right to collective bargaining. His environmental record shows a similar deference to administrative rulemaking, even when taking these stands entails creating disparities between circuits or even weakening the effect of a deleterious Supreme Court decision. This regard for substantial justice could only benefit the Court and the nation.

In a final note, the Republicans regularly attribute to their own party a profound concern about governmental overreach and a deep belief in the separation of powers, but their refusal to perform a necessary part of the political process belies their rhetoric. In this polarized climate, both parties would do well to heed Justice Frankfurter's comments on the comparatively minimal political gridlock existing in 1952: "It would stultify one's faith in our people to entertain even a momentary fear that the patriotism and the wisdom of the President and the Congress, as well as the long view of the immediate parties in interest, will not find ready accommodation for differences on matters which, however close to their concern and however intrinsically important, are overshadowed by the awesome issues which confront the world." (Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579). Or they could start by simply acknowledging that, as Justice Jackson (who once occupied the now-vacant S.C. seat) once said, "Process which is a mere gesture is not due process." (Mullane v. Hanover, 339 U.S. 306).

Boycott Food: Progressive Cookies

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Mondelez.jpgWe at PlanetGreen thoroughly understand the love-hate relationship between liberals and boycotts. On the one hand, they're empowering illustrations of how a little solidarity truly can go a long way. But on the other, even the most dedicated activists still cannot escape those basic human weaknesses that so often hamper attempts to rise above corporate wrongdoing, like the need to stay on a budget, the search for that perfect Christmas-y touch, or the craving for cookies.

Fortunately, this time, the quest to steer clear of Oreos and the other products of grocery conglomerate Mondelez International does not have to result in sugar deprivation, thanks to Robert and Belle La Follette.

LaFollette 1.jpgIn 1909, the Wisconsin Senator founded an eponymous magazine which primarily featured articles by many leading liberals of the day, such as Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell, and Louis Brandeis, on subjects ranging from the Red Scare to the emerging Civil Rights Movement. Senator Bob, in the introduction to the first issue, set forth the mission of his publication:

"In the course of every attempt to establish or develop free government, a struggle between Special Privilege and Equal Rights is inevitable. The battle is just on. It is young yet. It will be the longest and hardest ever fought for Democracy. In other lands, the people have lost. Here we shall win. It is a glorious privilege to live in this time, and have a free hand in this fight for government by the people."

Alongside the exposes and editorials, it also contained a section by his wife and co-editor, Belle, on economical living, education reform, healthy habits - and recipes. Her century-old "Butter Cookies" taste remarkably like Nilla wafers (a Mondelez product), and are an easy, inexpensive, and delicious substitute for the off-limits snacks:

PROGRESSIVE COOKIES

La Follette 3.jpgIngredients:
1 cup flour
1/2 teaspoon baking powder
1/2 stick butter, melted
2/3 cup sugar
1 egg
Small pinch salt

Directions:
Preheat oven to 325 degrees.
Combine dry ingredients in medium-sized bowl, then add eggs, butter, and sugar. Stir until smooth (batter will be wet).
Spoon in small teaspoonfuls onto cookie sheet. Bake for 15-20 min or until golden brown around edges.
Enjoy (and bask in the knowledge of your fidelity to the cause!)

While There Is a Criminal Element...

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serverpic.jpg...Socialists have, historically, been lumped in with it. Many liberals have noted the uncanny parallels between Bernie Sanders' current campaign and the Presidential bid that Eugene Debs made from his prison cell in 1920, after being incarcerated in the Red Scare crackdown on the political left. As he famously declared after his conviction, he was only jailed for his belief in the equality of all people: " Your Honor, years ago I recognized my kinship with all living beings, and I made up my mind that I was not one bit better than the meanest on earth. I said then, and I say now, that while there is a lower class, I am in it, and while there is a criminal element I am of it, and while there is a soul in prison, I am not free." This time around, however, it isn't Sanders who faces a potential run-in with the law on his road to the White House; rather, it is his opponent, establishment favorite Hillary Clinton.

Though Hillary herself does not seem very concerned about the potential indictment of herself or her close associates for her mishandling of classified information, it remains a distinct possibility. If there are charges, prosecutors have multiple options for how to pursue the case, and rampant speculation concerning possible counts against the Secretary has clouded the conversation. Realistically, though, an indictment concerning the server incident would probably be based in the following statutes:

hillary.jpgThe most straightforward avenue is the Espionage Act, which subjects "Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States... any classified information" to up to ten years in prison. Title 18 U.S.C. §798. Though a sentence containing any prison time is highly unlikely, Hillary would have to turn over the servers if convicted - a dramatic consequence that her opponents would have no difficulty converting into a campaign spectacle. Even though she is unlikely to receive anywhere close to the prescribed penalty, an eventual prosecution would doubtlessly draw off this section because of its unquestionable relevance to the facts. Ironically, this is also the same law that Debs was imprisoned under another portion of, but no serious constitutional challenges have yet been sustained.

Prosecutors will likely compound that count with 18 U.S.C.
§1519, an obstruction-of-justice law which, for most of its career, has been restricted to instances of paper shredding. However, its actual language is quite broad, criminalizing conduct that "alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object." Interestingly, the Supreme Court ruled last Term in Yates v. United States (13-7451) that an illegally caught grouper fish was not a "tangible object" within the meaning of the statute, because it was not analogous to the corporate records the legislature intended to preserve by passing the law. This could result in a drawn-out challenge on the grounds that emails are not technically "tangible objects" either, potentially redefining the rule yet again.

Given the prospective infirmities of §1519 and the fact that Hillary has long been the establishment candidate in the Democratic race, a conviction is not expected. Rather, this controversy will probably resolve itself in either dropped charges, an inconclusive plea deal that does not distinctly assign fault to the Secretary or, if such a deal is not offered, in lengthy litigation over the technical wording and application of the apposite laws. Whichever occurs, however, this story will indubitably continue to dominate political headlines in the coming months.

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